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LOCATION, LOCATION, LOCATION:
USING COST OF LIVING TO ACHIEVE TAx EQUITY
James M Puckett*
ABSTRACT

All other things being equal, the federal income tax ignores whether
the taxpayer lives in a relatively affordable or expensive location. This
approach can lead to unfairness; moreover, special deductions for the
taxpayer's actual living expenses, such as home mortgage interest and
state and local taxes, do not solve the problem. Tax law scholars have
generally been quick to dismiss the equity issues based on assumptions
about taxpayer mobility. The existing literature would tax comparable
workers equally, regardless of salary and living costs. This approach
would unfairly equate differently situated workers. This Article questions
the assumption of taxpayer mobility, considers the equity issues associated
with failure to index the tax system properly, and assesses potential
solutions.
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INTRODUCTION

All other things being equal, the federal income tax ignores whether the
taxpayer lives in a relatively affordable or expensive location. This
approach can lead to unfairness; moreover, special deductions for the
taxpayer's actual living expenses, such as home mortgage interest and state
and local taxes, do not solve the problem.' Tax law scholars have generally
been quick to dismiss the equity issues based on assumptions about
taxpayer mobility. The existing literature would tax comparable workers
equally, regardless of salary and living costs. This approach would unfairly
equate differently situated workers. This Article questions the assumption
of taxpayer mobility, considers the equity issues associated with failure to
index the tax system properly, and assesses potential solutions.
The equity issue is whether it is fair to ignore what the taxpayer can
afford to purchase with the taxpayer's income in determining the
taxpayer's ability to pay tax. 2 Two workers who earn the same salary may
have different purchasing power depending on where they reside. This is
because the prices of housing, food, transportation, and other living
expenses vary from place to place. The federal income tax generally
disregards these variations. For example, a $50,000 salary generally bears
1.
These deductions are not intended to function as local cost of living adjustments; they do,
however, have that effect.
2.
See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Can Tax Expenditure Analysis Be Divorced
from a Normative Tax Base?: A Critique of the "New Paradigm" and Its Denouement, 30 VA. TAX
REV. 135, 156 (2010) (describing "ability-to-pay" as the "most important" among an "array of widely
accepted tax policy criteria").
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the same federal income tax burden in affordable Mississippi as in
unaffordable Manhattan. Residents of high-cost areas have claimed that
their incomes are subjected to higher tax rates too quickly given their cost
of living.3
The idea that ability to pay should take the taxpayer's purchasing
power into account has somewhat carelessly percolated into the federal
income tax system. Inflation adjustments increase the standard deduction,
personal exemption,5 and the tax brackets6 to reflect purchasing power.
Such adjustments prevent year-to-year increases in income from pushing a
taxpayer into a higher tax bracket, if the taxpayer's purchasing power has
not changed. Inflation adjustments are not, however, systematically applied
throughout the tax system. Moreover, despite the recognized importance
of purchasing power to ability to pay, the tax system generally has not
extended the linkage to take into account differences in purchasing power
that depend on where-as opposed to when-the taxpayer earns income.
Professors Kaplow, Knoll, and Griffith examine the inefficiency of the
tax system's treatment of local cost of living differences, but their analysis
essentially assumes that the inefficiency of the system eliminates any
potential inequity.8 This literature assumes a highly mobile workforce such
that the utility of comparable workers will be equal regardless of where
workers are located; moreover, the literature assumes local cost of living
adjustments to the tax system would simply lead to migration and wage and
price changes.9 That is why the existing literature would tax comparable
workers equally; under the literature's assumptions, to attempt to do
otherwise would be ineffective and inefficient in the long run.
3.
See Paul Sullivan, Tax Burdens Tilt Coastal, and System's Fairness Is Debated, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 2011, at B5 ("'The system is not totally fair, but I guess the question is, who is it most unfair
to?' said Mark Luscombe, principal federal tax analyst for CCH . . . . 'It's most unfair to the New
Yorker, and no one has much sympathy for the New Yorker."'); Charles E. Schumer, Bay Ridge Is Not
Biloxi, NEWSDAY (New York), Oct. I1, 1993, at 40; David A. Levy, Index Federal Income Taxes,
NEWSDAY (New York), Apr. 2, 1993, at 66; see also H.R. 1943, 111th Cong. (2009) (bill to index
brackets for regional differences in cost of living).
4.
I.R.C. §63(c)(4).
5.
I.R.C. § 151(d)(4).
6.
I.R.C. § l(f).
A complete examination of the intersection of inflation with the tax system is beyond the scope
7.
of this Article. Moreover, unless otherwise noted, references herein to variations in purchasing power or
living costs mean differences from place to place, not differences over time. It is worth noting,
however, that the tax system does not consistently account for inflation. For example, the basis of
property is not indexed for inflation, nor is the principal of debt. For additional discussion, see
INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1976); John T. Plecnik, Abolish the Inflation
Tax on the Poor & Middle Class, 29 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 925 (2011); Reed Shuldiner, Indexing the Tax
Code, 48 TAX L. REv. 537 (1993).
8.
See Louis Kaplow, Regional Cost-of-Living Adjustments in Tax/Transfer Schemes, 51 TAX L.
REv. 175, 178 (1996); Michael S. Knoll & Thomas D. Griffith, Taxing Sunny Days: Adjusting Taxes
for RegionalLiving Costs and Amenities, 116 HARV. L. REv. 987, 1018 (2003).
9.
See infra Part II.A.
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This Article rethinks the literature's assumptions about mobility. There
is good reason to believe that significant frictions impede mobility.o These
frictions include location-specific ties, limitations on information, cognitive
limitations, cognitive biases, and moving costs. Thus, many workers are
effectively stranded, at least to some degree, in a particular location, even if
better opportunities exist elsewhere. Accordingly, this Article argues that it
is unfair to ignore local cost of living differences, particularly at relatively
low incomes.
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, Part I argues that local cost
of living should be a factor in the determination of a taxpayer's ability to
pay tax. In Part II, this Article reviews the prior literature that examines
how the federal income tax should account for local cost of living
differences. Finally, in Part III, this Article assesses potential methods for
implementation of local cost of living adjustments. This Article concludes
that tax relief targeted to low-income taxpayers in high-cost areas, such as
adjustments to the standard deduction and Earned Income Tax Credit,
would be most defensible and appropriate.
I.

ABILITY TO PAY TAx, PROGRESSIVITY, AND LOCAL COST OF LIVING

This Part argues that the cost of living structure where the taxpayer
resides should be a factor in the implementation of a progressive income
tax based on ability to pay. After laying out the case for local cost of living
adjustments, this Part acknowledges objections and in response suggests a
targeted approach.
A. ProgressivityShould Take into Account the Local Cost Structure
The normative income tax base includes consumption plus changes in
wealth during the taxable year." As implemented, taxable income is
subject to tax brackets with rates currently ranging from 0% at low incomes
(counting the standard deduction and personal exemption together as a
zero-rate bracket) to 35% at the highest incomes. The application of higher
tax rates at higher incomes is known as progressivity.
The progressive rate structure is grounded in the fundamental tax
fairness norm that the tax burden should be "allocated among resident
taxpayers in relation to their taxpaying capacities, often referred to as the
principle of ability-to-pay."l 2 The norm of ability to pay is fairly well

10.
See infra Part II.B.
11.
Fleming & Peroni, supranote 2, at 144 n.36.
12.
Id. at 156 (describing ability to pay as the "most important" among an "array of widely
accepted tax policy criteria").
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accepted; what is more problematic is identifying the precise rationales for
ability to pay and progressivity.13 Blum and Kalven's classic article on the
topic describes the case for progressivity as "stubborn but uneasy."1 4
Several potential justifications for progressivity exist. Utilitarians
justify higher marginal rates at higher incomes on the assumption that
utility diminishes faster than income rises.' 5 Losing a dollar, so the
argument goes, feels less bad to the wealthy than to the poor. Others have
rejected interpersonal comparisons of utility as the basis for progressivity.
Yet another potential justification is that benefits received from the
government increase faster than income." This could be true if, for
example, expensive public goods such as national defense, highways,
education, and the like are particularly beneficial to the wealthy.18 Another
rationale is that income is distributed unfairly and the tax system should
attempt to redistribute it to those with less resources. 19 Rather than a direct
and reliable product of merit and hard work, income may be a result of
luck, social conditions, talent, and other factors.20
Of these potential theories, redistribution aimed to reduce inequality
seems more coherently to justify progressivity. 2 1 As Professor Lawsky has
argued, utilitarian theories of progressivity may implicitly assign value to
equality or measure utility normatively, and may not aggregate taxpayers'
subjective utility. 22 Contrary to traditional assumptions of declining
marginal utility, there is empirical evidence that the marginal utility of

See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES
13.
AND POLICIES 30 (4th ed. 2002); LAURIE L. MALMAN, LINDA F. SUGIN, LEWIS D. SOLOMON & JEROME
M. HESCH, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX BASE: CASES, PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN FEDERAL

TAXATION 12-13 (2002); Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417, 519-20 (1952); James M. Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priorities:
MarriageNeutrality, Children, and ContemporaryFamilies, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1409, 1417 (2010).
14.
Blum & Kalven, supranote 13, at 519-20.
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 13, at 30.
15.
16.
Id. ("This argument is criticized on the ground that the importance of particular preferences to
individual taxpayers cannot be measured objectively. Indeed, there is little reason to assume that the
progressive rate schedule is systematically related to the declining marginal utility of income.").
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id. at 32.
19.
20.
Id. at 33 ("The case for progressive taxation thus becomes far easier when one rejects the
strong presumption that the market distribution of income and wealth is necessarily linked to fairness or
freedom.").
21.
See Blum & Kalven, supra note 13, at 519-20; Michael A. Livingston, Blum and Kalven at
50: Progressive Taxation, "Globalization," and the New Millennium, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 731, 745-46
(2000) ("The alternate arguments-diminishing marginal utility of money, the benefit theory and the
breakup of large concentrations of wealth-were dubious even in Blum and Kalven's day, and
intermediate developments have if anything weakened these further. . . . There is no escaping the
redistributive or fairness issue.").
22.
See Sarah B. Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L.
REv. 904, 914 (2011).
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money actually increases at some ranges of income. The explanation may
be that there are differing socioeconomic levels within which increases in
income are relatively insignificant, while climbing from one class to
another-for example, from poor to middle class or from middle class to
wealthy-is more meaningful.2 4
As Professor Lawsky notes, "A welfarist who does not explicitly
incorporate equality into his analysis (that is, a nonegalitarian welfarist)
and assumes that all individuals have . .. utility curves [that] are convex for
some range of income[] will recommend a tax system that is quite different
than the current progressive, redistributive system."25 This is because such
a welfarist "maximizes utility by summing individuals' utility, giving equal
weight to each individual." 2 6 The non-egalitarian welfarist, therefore,
"always wants to take a dollar from someone with lower marginal utility
and give that dollar to someone with higher marginal utility." 27 However, a
welfarist can accommodate this notion by incorporating the importance of
equality into her social welfare function or by acknowledging that utility is
normative rather than subjective. 28 Once this move is made, utilitarian
justifications for progressivity and egalitarian justifications tend to
converge and lead to the same questions concerning fundamental fairness.29
A comparison of incomes does not provide a complete picture of
inequality when local cost of living structures differ. A taxpayer in a lowcost location may be wealthier at a lower income than a taxpayer in a highcost location with a higher income. Framing wealth in this way implicitly
values certain forms of wealth higher than others. Basic needs such as food,
housing, and transportation are important. This should not be undercut
because some taxpayers in high-cost locations have better access to a
warm, sunny climate or other local amenities.
One might object that adjusting the taxpayer's tax on account of high
local cost of living is effectively a personal deduction. But that is how the
progressive rate structure already works. Low-rate brackets can be
reformulated as applying the highest rate to a base adjusted downward by

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id at 929-39.
Id. at 935-36.
Id. at 940.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 950.
Id. at 951 ("But the conversations that she has will change. She can no longer refuse to

discuss moral commitments, because she has acknowledged that her assumption of declining marginal

utility of income is a moral commitment. Her results are not incontrovertible or unassailable; rather,
they are open to challenges from those with different moral commitments. . . . And these are
conversations worth having.") (internal citations omitted).
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deductions.30 These unstated deductions are not in respect of any profitseeking expense but rather are grounded in norms of distributive justice
underlying progressivity. An egalitarian vision of progressivity treats
certain personal expenditures-the most basic ones-better than others by
imposing lower rates at lower incomes. The tax system should take into
account purchasing power at a particular location in determining what level
of income affords basic, and then more and more luxurious, standards of
living.
B. Objections to FactoringLocal Cost ofLiving into Progressivity
In a brief "Point-Counterpoint" forum, several tax scholars argue that
local cost of living adjustments would be unfair. Professors Angelini and
Noga conclude in a "Point" piece that eliminating personal deductions
would improve the equity of the tax system because taxpayers with the
same income should pay the same tax, even if local costs differ.32 Two
pieces labeled "Counterpoints" seem to agree with the "Point" but frame it
even more forcefully. Professor Johnson argues that "[y]ou get . . . what

you pay for" on the market and "[i]f people are getting full value for their
higher costs, it would be inequitable to filter that out of the tax system." 33
Professor Dodge agrees that a "high cost must be worth it," and likens high
housing costs to excess consumption of "food, alcohol, drugs, or

gambling." 34
Alternatively, both Professors Johnson and Dodge appear to
characterize living in a high-cost area as a choice that should not be
subsidized, because taxpayers may move to a less expensive place. As
Johnson explains, it is impossible to "avoid inflation by moving around in
time, whereas you can avoid a high cost of living or adjust your costs to

30.
To see how progressive rates function as a base modification, consider the following example.
Rates below the highest rate in the rate schedule can be reformulated as a single high effective rate
applied to a lower income. For example, a simple two-bracket tax system might provide that taxable
income up to $100 is taxed at a 20% rate, while the excess of income over $100 is taxed at a 40% rate.
An equivalent, but less obvious, way to express this concept is the tax equals 40% of an adjusted
taxable income, where 50% of taxable income up to $100 is excluded. For example, $120 of income
results in a tax of $28 under either structure. The sum of $100 taxed at 20% and $20 taxed at 40% is a
$28 tax. Equivalently, 40% times an adjusted income of $70 yields a $28 tax. The $70 adjusted income
reflects a deduction of $50 (50% of $100) being taken from $120.
31.
Point & Counterpoint, Equity, Cost ofLiving, and the InternalRevenue Code, 24 A.B.A. SEC.
TAX'N NEWSQUARTERLY I (Summer 2009).
32.
James P. Angelini & Tracy Noga, Improving the Equity of the FederalIncome Tax, 24 A.B.A.
SEC. TAX'N NEWSQUARTERLY 1 (Summer 2009).
33.
Calvin H. Johnson, The Inequities in Cost of Living Adjustments, 24 A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N
NEWSQUARTERLY 24 (Summer 2009).
34.
Joseph Dodge, The Inequities in Cost of Living Adjustments, 24 A.B.A. SEC. TAX'N
NEWSQUARTERLY 26 (Summer 2009).
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your preferences by moving around geographically."3 5 Similarly, Dodge
asserts that "[n]o person is compelled to live in the Bay area or prohibited
from moving to a low-cost area (say, Cleveland)."3 6
C. A Response to the Critics:Limit Adjustments to Low-Income Taxpayers
In sum, scholars have raised two equity objections to adjusting the
federal income tax for local cost of living differences. First, the taxpayer is
implicitly paying for local amenities when the taxpayer pays for living
costs. Second, taxpayers may relocate if they do not sufficiently value the
local amenities.
1. Amenities andExternalities
If it is agreed that purchasing power matters in constructing ability to
pay tax, then equating taxpayers with different purchasing power, because
they arguably have different access to consumer amenities, amounts to
taxing utility or deducting disutility. This is a selective foray into taxing
imputed income. The enjoyment of amenities such as sunshine and
consumer variety does not allow a taxpayer to pay expenses, unlike
compensation. The tax system has generally ignored pleasure in assigning
tax liability. Taxpayers do not, for example, recognize income upon
reading books or walking around the park. Nor does the tax system allow
deductions for unhappiness or stress, even if it is directly related to the
taxpayer's employment. It is certainly true that the tax system has generally
used nominal dollar amounts as a proxy for ability to pay. This is, to be
sure, convenient and easily administrable. Inflation adjustments, however,
imply that the purchasing power of the income is important, even though
looking beyond nominal amounts may be more complicated. Inflation
adjustments are not barred simply because different goods or different
qualities of goods are being offered in later years.
Moreover, some living costs have little to do with personal enjoyment.
Living costs theoretically comprise two components: production amenities,
which are valued by businesses, and consumption amenities, which are
valued by consumers. Compensation may, therefore, partially adjust for
production amenities. A skilled worker pursuing a high paying job, which
is fundamentally a productive endeavor, cannot opt out of the weather or
the local culture.
35.
Johnson, supranote 33, at 25.
36.
Dodge, supra note 34, at 26.
37.
See Katie Fitzpatrick & Jeffrey P. Thompson, The Interactionof Metropolitan Cost-of-Living
and the FederalEarned Income Tax Credit: One Size Fits All?, 63 NAT'L TAX J. 419, 422 (2010)
(showing limited association between wages and cost of living).
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Might these amenities overlap? As Professor Edward Glaeser explains,
despite "pundits . . . predicting that new forms of communication would

make urban life irrelevant," technology has not rendered proximity
irrelevant. 38 Indeed, a "wealth of research confirms the importance of faceto-face contact."39 This productive face-to-face contact has been fueled by
cities being "reinvigorated as places of consumption, through restaurants,
theaters, comedy clubs, bars, and the pleasures of proximity."" If skilled
workers are more productive in close proximity to one another, and people
are drawn close to one another because cities are "urban theme parks,"A1
are the consumption amenities not also productive? 42
It would be unfair and incomplete to give residents of low cost areas a
free pass in this analysis. Even if residents of low-cost areas sacrifice
pleasure for purchasing power, they should be taxed on their purchasing
power.43 There does not, however, appear to be such a sacrifice; residents
of low-cost areas often appear to be happier than residents of high-cost
areas.44 In addition, it is quite possible that residents of low-cost areas are
getting more than what they pay for, because many low-cost locations are
low-density. Low-density locations may have substantial environmental
externalities.45
2. Limitations on Mobility
Particularly at low incomes, moving or staying in place may not be a
completely voluntary decision. It is true that migration is possible, and
many people move even under financial distress, but there are important
challenges. Moving may involve significant fixed costs relative to the
means of a person who subsists paycheck-to-paycheck. Assuming she has
the money, how will a poor Bay Area resident predict her job opportunities
in Cleveland? What if she manages to move but does not actually secure
the job of her dreams, or she misjudges the local cost structure? It seems
unlikely that the government will assist much if a move fails but will
See EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 36 (2011).
38.
Id. at 34.
39.
Id. at 11.
40.
41.
Id.
The standard analysis is that an amenity is "productive" if a business compensates a worker
42.
for the cost of the amenity. However, compensation may not prove much about the nature of the
amenities, because compensation depends on bargaining power and other factors. See Martha T.
McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State,
78 IND. L.J. 783, 809 (2003) ("[T]he incentive effects neoliberalism calls 'moral hazard' boil down to
questions of relative bargaining power. As one party to a transaction gets more bargaining power in
relation to another, that party is better able to shift the costs of the transaction to the other party.").
This is precisely what happens if a taxpayer eams money but would prefer leisure to work.
43.
See infra text accompanying notes 112-115.
44.
45.
See GLAESER, supra note 38, at 217-22.
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charge her with the ability to move successfully if she does not. Family and
social connections at home may make child care more affordable and may
help with sharing other costs, such as housing or transportation.
Even at higher incomes, relocation presents a risk. Perhaps the costs of
conducting a move are less significant as income increases (or more likely
to be borne by a new employer), but the issue of predicting happiness at a
potential new home remains. How does the taxpayer confidently predict
how a new social environment will work for her; how she will react to a
different climate; how she will feel about being away from family and old
friends; intangible aspects of a new job; and myriad other factors? If a
whole family has to move, informational issues (predicting employment,
happiness, or both, at the new location) multiply. 46
Divorce and child custody significantly impact labor mobility and the
reasonableness of assessing fault against the taxpayer for not moving. For
example, a joint custody agreement might require the parents to reside
within a set geographic distance from the former spouse, on pain of losing
joint custody rights. Visitation rights might also be contingent on
geographic proximity. Given that many marriages end in divorce, the
mobility problems associated with maintaining parental rights are far from
merely theoretical. A parent might well choose to abjure better job
prospects and opportunities for professional advancement in order to play
an active parenting role. Moreover, the value of parenting is
incommensurable; it is not realistic to affix a mathematical value on
parenting and presume that, if a job in a distant market meets or exceeds
the value of a divorced parent maintaining a relationship with a child, he or
she will or should trade his or her parenting relationship for enhanced
professional opportunities.47
It is easy to assume, for purposes of analytical clarity, that people will
move with the winds of economic opportunity, but in the real world, people
find themselves, if not literally tied to the land, at least tied to each other in
ways that significantly complicate worker mobility. Notwithstanding these
concerns, one might balk at the idea of a potential subsidy for consumer
46.
Fortunately and unfortunately, there is no omniscient Navigator to guide workers in this
decision making process. See Shari Perkins, The Navigator, THEATER ONLINE http://www.theater
online.com/Teviewshow.xzc?PK=37284 (last visited Feb. 21, 2012) ("In a time of widespread
unemployment, gut-wrenching debt, rampant home foreclosures, and families fracturing under the
pressure of a financial crunch the like of which Americans have not experienced since the 1930s, it is
easy to feel powerless and paralyzed. What if we could know what the right choice is at the each and
every intersection in our lives? . . . This is the fantasy that Eddie Antar's new play The
Navigator explores . . . .").
47.
See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403
(2001) (arguing that certain forms of dependency, such as childhood, disability, and old age are
universal, and that society should support caregiving). A child might assume significant caregiving
duties with respect to an elderly parent, for example, which might also significantly impact potential
mobility.
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amenities in high-cost areas. Past some income threshold, it may be more
reasonable to assume that the taxpayer is simply paying for consumer
amenities. This approach has the virtue of simplicity and would prevent
abuse or the appearance of abuse. There is a risk to taxpayer morale of an
unfair subsidy, or even the appearance of an unfair subsidy.4 8 This risk
presumably increases as taxpayers at higher income levels receive benefits.
Taxpayers in or near poverty by local standards should receive a local cost
of living adjustment, but whether the adjustment should extend beyond that
income level is far more debatable.
In addition, local cost of living adjustments are less defensible as
income rises because of departures in the statutory tax base from the
normative tax base. Typically, for higher-income taxpayers, the tax base
becomes decoupled from ability to pay, due to numerous statutory and nonstatutory exclusions from income. 49 The realization rule5 o generally means
that changes in wealth are not taken into account until a sale, exchange,
disposition, or some other clear accession to wealth, as opposed to
immediately upon appreciation.51 Gifts and inheritances are excluded from
income. 5 2 Long-term capital gains are generally taxed at a much lower rate
than ordinary income. These and other preferences result in a much less
predictable effective rate of tax for wealthy taxpayers. As taxable income
becomes a more imperfect proxy for ability to pay, it is less coherent to
adjust for local cost of living.
II.

REVIEW OF PRIOR LITERATURE

This Part first reviews the existing literature that examines how the
federal income tax system should account for local cost of living
differences; it then discusses why a different approach should be used.

48.
See Sullivan, supra note 3 ("Or as Joseph J. Thorndike, the director of the tax history project
at Tax Analysts, said, any regional adjustment 'might as well be called the Bicoastal Elite Tax Relief
Act.' He added, 'It would shower all these benefits on Palo Alto and New York City, and the rest of the
country would be outraged."')
49.
See Beverly Moran, Wealth Redistribution and the Income Tax, 53 How. L.J. 319, 322-26
(2010).
50.
See I.R.C. § 1001(a); GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 13, at 154-55 (explaining the
realization rule).
51.
The realization rule has been rationalized as an administrative necessity, but the
administrative difficulties of mark-to-market taxation may be overstated. See David Elkins, The Myth of
Realization: Mark-to-Market Taxation of Publicly-Traded Securities, 10 FLA. TAx REv. 375 (2010);
David M. Schizer, Realization as Subsidy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1549 (1998); David J. Shakow, Taxation
Without Realization: A Proposalfor Accrual Taxation, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1111 (1986).
52.
See I.R.C. § 102(a).
See I.R.C. § 1(h).
53.
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A. Summary ofPriorLiterature
To my knowledge, there are only two law review articles examining
whether the federal income tax should be adjusted for local cost of living
variations. 54 As discussed in this Part, both articles assume that there is no
inequity in failing to adjust for local cost of living, because migration
equalizes living standards across the country. Nevertheless, both articles
argue that the tax system should tax comparable workers equally, to
remove the tax disincentive on living and working in relatively productive
locations. From an equity standpoint, however, their approach would
unfairly equate differently situated workers.
1. Kaplow
In the seminal law review article examining local cost of living
adjustments in the tax system, Professor Kaplow generally assumes that
standards of living will be equalized from location to location through
migration. 5 This is premised on workers' decisions maximizing their wellbeing. 56 Accordingly, if one location has relatively high pay in relation to
cost of living, workers will move to that area, wages will move down in
response to the increased supply of labor, and prices will move up in
response to the increased demand. In contrast, if one location has
relatively low pay in relation to cost of living, workers will leave that area,
wages will move up in response to the reduced supply of labor, and prices
will fall in response to the reduced demand.58 Thus, in equilibrium, workers
will be indifferent among locations.5 9
Building on the assumption that in equilibrium workers will be
indifferent as to their location, Kaplow considers how the tax system
should be adjusted to preserve the allocation of workers among locations
that would be obtained in a no-tax world. 60 As he conceives of it, this is not
an equity-based approach because migration would nullify any tax inequity
among locations; rather, the goal is to avoid tax-induced migration.61 In
other words, the assumption is that if taxes are too high in a location,
workers will migrate to a low-tax location, which will cause wages to rise

54.
See Kaplow, supranote 8; Knoll & Griffith, supranote 8.
Kaplow, supra note 8, at 178.
55.
56.
Id
57.
Id. at 179.
58.
Id.
59.
Id
60.
Id at 180.
61.
Id. ("This may appear to be a horizontal equity norm, but I do not posit any such normative
significance to this benchmark.").
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and living costs to fall in the high-tax location. 6 2 Similarly, migration
would cause wages to fall and living costs to rise in the low-tax location to
which workers migrate. 6 3 Essentially, such market adjustments would move
opposite any apparent tax inequity and nullify it. In this view, there is no
tax inequity among locations, but tax-induced migration has been
inefficient because it has resulted in an allocation of labor different from
the one that would have been achieved in a world without taxes. 64
Kaplow envisions-but because of administrability concerns does not
quite propose-local cost of living adjustments that would cause the tax
system to impose the same reduction in purchasing power on individuals
with the same pre-tax utility so that they would have equal post-tax
utility. 6 5 The goal of maintaining equal utility between two given workers
in different locations both pre- and post-tax is to eliminate any incentive for
migration to achieve better results. 6 6 If the two workers who are as well-off
as each other before tax remain equally well-off as one another after the tax
is imposed, they would have no tax incentives to migrate, but if the tax
imposes different reductions in purchasing power on the two workers, they
will no longer be as well-off as each other and will have incentives to
migrate.67
Kaplow's system would not adjust for the cost of consumption
amenities, because a taxpayer's well-being or utility includes both wages
and the taxpayer's enjoyment of local amenities. 68 In "assessing economic
well-being, there is no systematic difference between" a high-cost location
with better climate and a low-cost location with worse climate. 6 9 Kaplow
assumes that in a world without taxes, equilibrium would be reached taking
into account amenities, resulting in greater demand for locations with
amenities and higher prices in such locations. 70 Therefore, if a local cost of
living adjustment purports to lower the tax burden in amenity-rich locations
by adjusting taxes downward for the high cost of living, tax-induced
migration will simply bid prices up even further, nullifying the apparent tax
benefit. Ultimately, a tax adjustment for local cost of living due to
amenities would not alter workers' well-being, but would result in an
inefficient allocation across regions.72
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id at
Id
Id. at
Id at
Id
Id.
Id. at
Id
Id. at
Id. at
Id.

179.
183-84.
183, 194-95.

190.
191.
191 n.43.
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As Kaplow demonstrates, in a flat tax with no exemptions, the tax
system essentially adjusts automatically without local cost of living
adjustments. As an example, assume a worker in high-cost location H is as
well-off with a $25,000 income as a worker in low-cost location L with a
$20,000 income.73 In other words, the cost of living in H is 1.25 times the
cost of living in L. This example assumes there are no differences in
amenities; implicitly, then, the cost of living in H must be due to
production amenities. Subjecting both workers' incomes to a 10% tax
results in a tax liability of $2,500 for the worker in H and a tax liability of
$2,000 for the worker in L.74 These amounts, although nominally different,
have the same purchasing power in their respective locations. Thus, both
workers are still equally well-off after taxes.
Kaplow does not state how a flat tax should be adjusted if there are
differences in consumption amenities. Kaplow's logic-equal tax for
taxpayers with equal utility-seems to require income to be increased for
local consumption amenities and decreased for local consumption
disamenities. Otherwise, there would be a tax incentive to move to regions
that compensate for low salaries with high amenities. Presumably, this
would be accomplished indirectly, by adjusting salary by a relative salary
multiplier.75
Kaplow explains why a tax system with multiple tax rate brackets is
inefficient without adjustment for local cost of living differences. The
adjustment can be accomplished by adjusting incomes or tax brackets.76
Assume, as before, that the cost of living in H is 1.25 times the cost of
living in L. 7 7 If, for example, income up to $10,000 is untaxed in L, H's 0%
bracket should extend to $12,500. Also assume, as before, that a worker in
L earns $20,000 and a worker in H earns $25,000. On these assumptions,
the taxpayer in L would pay $1,000 in tax, while the taxpayer in H would
pay $1,250 in tax. These are locally equivalent reductions in purchasing
power so the taxpayers remain equally well-off after tax. Kaplow shows
that an equivalent method is to adjust income in H ($25,000) down to its
equivalent in L ($20,000), apply the tax rates to the adjusted income
(yielding $1,000 in tax), then convert the tentative tax into an amount that
carries equivalent purchasing power in H ($1,250).71
In contrast to his overarching goal of preserving the allocation in a
world without taxes, Kaplow concludes that migration of the poor from
high-cost to low-cost areas would be efficient. As Kaplow explains,
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id at 182.
Id
Id. at 194-95.
Id. at 187.
See id. at 183 n.18.
Id

2012]

Location, Location, Location

605

"Taking the extreme case, it is more efficient for those who do not work
and just receive welfare payments to live in low-cost rather than high-cost
areas, for then they can be maintained at the same standard of living at a
lower cost to the government."7 9 Because dollars go further in low-cost
areas, lower nominal amounts in low-cost areas can be more generous than
higher nominal amounts in high-cost areas. Kaplow assumes that if benefits
are somewhat more generous in low-cost areas, the poor would move.80
2. Knoll and Griffith
Professors Knoll and Griffith make a similar argument for local cost of
living adjustments in the tax system. Like Kaplow, Knoll and Griffith
assume migration will equalize living standards among locations and
eliminate tax inequity. As they put it, "fairness arguments-either for or
against adjusting the tax burden to account for differences in regional living
costs-are uneasy at best because competition from interregional migration
tends to eliminate differences in living standards for individuals with
similar skills and drive." 8' However, Knoll and Griffith reject the allocation
of workers in a world without taxes as the benchmark by which tax
adjustments should be judged. Knoll and Griffith argue that such allocation
fails to maximize social benefits.
In their view, "[i]nterregional efficiency requires that total social
benefits are equal when private benefits are equal."82 The premise behind
this conclusion is that "the purchasing power of a dollar of after-tax income
is in proportion to the cost of living in the region where it was earned,
while the purchasing power of a dollar of tax revenue is independent of the
cost of living in the region where it was raised."83 Location-independent
uses of revenue include "generating national public goods, such as foreign
aid, national defense, public parks, or the Washington bureaucracy."84
Accordingly, Knoll and Griffith propose indexing even under a flat tax.85
Knoll and Griffith would impose higher tax rates in low cost areas and
lower tax rates in high-cost areas in order to increase tax revenue.8 6 It is
assumed that consumption amenities are equal so the difference in local
cost of living must come from differences in local production amenities.
Assuming workers are indifferent before these new taxes are imposed, this
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 187.
Id.
Knoll & Griffith, supra note 8, at 988.
Id. at 1000.
Id.
Id. at 995.
Id. at 1000.
Id. at 1002-04.
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is expected to induce migration to high-cost, high-productivity areaswhere pay and tax revenue will be higher-and away from low-cost, lowproductivity areas-where pay and tax revenue will be lower. 8 7 Pay in the
low-cost areas would be expected to rise, while pay in the high-cost areas
would be expected to fall. As indicated previously, Knoll and Griffith
assume that migration and its effect on pay will make comparable workers
equally well-off no matter where they reside.
Under Knoll and Griffith's proposal, tax rates are not adjusted for the
cost of consumption amenities, but tax rates are adjusted to the extent
salaries are changed by consumption amenities.89 Relatively low levels of
consumption amenities push salaries higher, push living costs lower, or
some combination of the two; in contrast, relatively high levels of
consumption amenities may push salaries lower, push living costs higher,
or both.90 Their approach prefers an allocation with more labor in highsalary, low-consumption amenity locations and less labor in low-salary,
high-consumption amenity locations because this results in more revenue
being collected from higher-salary workers and spent in a locationindependent manner.
Because of the inability of cost adjustment to account for consumption
amenity differentials reflected in salaries, Knoll and Griffith adopt a
relative salary method. 91 The relative salary method involves identifying
comparable workers across locations and constructing a relative pay index
by location. High relative salaries are taxed at a relatively low rate, while
low relative salaries are taxed at a relatively high rate. High relative salaries
are assumed to compensate for local cost of living differences due to
productive amenities, low consumption amenity levels, or both. Low
relative salaries are assumed to reflect lower production amenities and/or
higher consumption amenities. Professor David Albouy also calls for the
tax system to adjust for local cost of living by use of relative salaries.92
Albouy seems cautious about the feasibility of measuring equivalent
labor, 93 but warns that the alternative of adjusting by local cost of living
will overly subsidize living in cities with consumer amenities and result in
overcrowding. 94

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
635, 648
93.
94.

Id. at1010.
Id.
Id. at 1016-17.
Id. at 1008.
Id. at 1013.
See David Albouy, The Unequal GeographicBurden ofFederal Taxation, 117 J. POL. ECON.
(2009).
Id
Id. at 649.
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B. NeoclassicalModel Used by PriorLiteratureIs Deficient
The prior literature's conclusions generally follow from its
assumptions, but this Article argues that different assumptions would be
more reasonable. As discussed below, there is good reason to believe that
migration will not correct tax inequity. If this is true, adjustment by relative
salaries could lead to unfairness rather than misallocation of resources;
moreover, the benefits and penalties could simply be windfalls. For
example, it is unfair to equate pleasure with purchasing power, as the
relative salary adjustment would do. Adjusting income by a relative salary
method unfairly overtaxes workers with low purchasing power in highcost/high-amenity locations and unfairly undertaxes workers with high
purchasing power in high-salary/low-amenity locations. To the extent that
workers will not move in response to the tax adjustment, or would have
moved anyway, the adjustments would create unfair windfalls and losses.
It is unclear theoretically that migration will lead to equal well-being
among locations. Classical economic models tend to assume perfect
information, utility-maximizing choices, and no transaction costs. 95 Under
these assumptions, it is clear that workers would migrate from one area to
another if they could improve their after-tax well-being. In reality, these
assumptions are unrealistic. Information can be imperfect, information
sometimes requires time and money to acquire, moving costs may be
significant, and individuals may not be perfectly capable of making utilitymaximizing calculations. 6
Although Kaplow tends to minimize the potential for the market to be
out of equilibrium, 9 7 Kaplow concedes that this is an incomplete picture:
Individuals consider more than wage levels, price indexes, and
general levels of amenities in deciding where to live. First,
individuals' preferences among nonpecuniary job attributes, goods
and services, and amenities will differ. Second, as a result of
personal history, individuals will have particular locational
preferences. Any move may involve significant direct costs. In
addition, one develops networks of friends, relationships with
institutions, and knowledge of the opportunities an area has to
95.
See Diane Lourdes Dick, Tax and Economic Policy Responses to the Medicaid Long-Term
Care FinancingCrisis: A Behavioral Economics Approach, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J.
379, 387-99 (2007).
96.
Id
97.
Kaplow, supra note 8, at 179 n.9 ("One might think that most workers are immobile so that
migration will be limited. But mobility is likely to be sufficient for the system usually to be in (or near)
equilibrium. If even a small fraction of individuals relocate each year-particularly among those
graduating from college, getting married, or changing occupations-the cumulative effect over time
will be substantial.").
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offer. Moving to a different region thus may involve considerable
sacrifice. Finally, individuals' locational decisions are interrelated:
Spouses need to make joint decisions and choices may depend on
the location of other relatives.98
In addition, it seems realistic to assume that tastes are heterogeneous. 99
Accordingly, only the marginal worker will be indifferent among locations,
even if equilibrium has been reached. 00 Some will value amenities more
than the market; some will value them less.' 0 Kaplow suggests that "[t]he
existence of preference variations also implies that the equilibrium
adjustment process may be slower than it otherwise would be." 02
Moreover, some theories suggest that regional shocks may be long lasting
or that regional productivity advantages can be self-perpetuating.' 0 3
The tax literature follows a hedonic model of urban development and
migration, which conceives of amenities as a driving force in the growth of
cities and the flow of population.10 4 Studies indicate that local consumption
amenities and high prices usually accompany one another, but they do not
prove that local consumption amenities cause high prices. 0 5 Professors
Storper and Scott review the new amenity literature and find it "devoid of
any consistent analytical description of the factors underlying the origins of
urban centers." 06 In their view, the better explanation of city growth is "an
organized production system that is increasingly locked into the initial
location by its own expanding stock of agglomeration economies in a
temporal dynamic of circular and cumulative causation."' 0 7 Amenities

98.
Id. at 193.
99.
One study concluded that more educated medical professionals have to be paid a premium to
locate in rural areas and will accept a decrease in wages for a desirable urban location, while lowerincome medical professionals require a wage premium in high cost areas because they do not value the
amenities. See Sanghoon Lee, Ability Sorting and Consumer City, 68 J. URB. ECON. 20 (2010).
100.
Kaplow, supra note 8, at 193.
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
103.
See MARK D. PARTRIDGE & DAN S. RICKMAN, THE GEOGRAPHY OF AMERICAN POVERTY:
IS THERE A NEED FOR PLACE-BASED POLICIES? 54 (2006).

104.
See id. at 177; Knoll & Griffith, supra note 8, at 991; cf Michael Storper & Allen J. Scott,
Rethinking Human Capital, Creativity, and Urban Growth, 9 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 147, 147-48 (2009)
(noting that the amenity-based "alternative body of research has risen to a position of prominence" but
concluding that the model has profound deficiencies).
105.
See Storper & Scott, supra note 104, at 154 ("impregnable circularity") .
Id. at 153 ("Accordingly, important forces endogenous to urban growth will be
106.
systematically underestimated. The types of models examined above implicitly and necessarily assume
the pre-existence of urban centers because this is the condition for subsequent amenity-induced
adjustments to occur. But what accounts for the existence of these cities to begin with? If we consider
only natural amenities such as sunshine, then it is necessary to explain why, at certain moments, they
move up or down in preference rankings.").
107.
Id. at 158.
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would be marginally relevant, if at all.10 Storper and Scott conclude that
there is no easy solution to optimize growth, but generally the focus should
be on "collective action to internalize externalities, to build effective norms
of economic interdependence, and to avoid adverse path selection." 0 9
Moreover, recent empirical findings concerning the effect of taxation
on migration and salaries do not comport with the hedonic model. A study
examining data from 1977 to 2002 finds that state "tax changes do not
impact interstate population flows, nor do they affect the relative wages of
movers." 10 A "natural experiment" examining the response of millionaires
to new high-income surtaxes in New Jersey finds "minimal effect" on
migration, even among the richest households."'
The amenity-based models do not appear to account for reported
happiness among the states. In a recent study of happiness among the
states, the authors analyze a random sample of 1.3 million U.S. residents
who reported their life satisfaction on a scale of 1 to 4, where 4 means
"very satisfied." 1 2 Differences in reported satisfaction "across states are
not minor . . . they correspond to up to 0.12 life-satisfaction points across

U.S. states, which is similar in size to the individual cross-sectional effect
on life satisfaction of marital separation or unemployment."1 3 The authors
regress reported life satisfaction against quality of life predicted by the
"most recent and thorough research in this vein" by economists.' 14
Although the study finds a statistically significant correlation, it finds that
the economic models explain only 36% of the variance in reported
happiness. 115
A behavioral economics perspective would suggest that tax-induced
migration is unlikely to occur. Behavioral economics emphasizes limits on
rational decision making."' 6 First, a potential decision maker may not even
engage with a problem in the first place. This seems quite likely in the case
of a worker with a well established life in a location. Second, there are
limits on rational decision making if the problem is actually considered.
Decision makers may not be able to comprehend all the data involved in a

108.
Id.
109.
Id. at 164.
110.
See Andrew Leigh, Do Redistributive State Taxes Reduce Inequality?, 61 NAT'L TAX J. 8 1,
95 (2008).
111.
See Cristobal Young & Charles Varner, Millionaire Migration and State Taxation of Top
Incomes: Evidencefrom a NaturalExperiment, 64 NAT'L TAX J. 255, 278 (2011).
112.
Andrew J. Oswald & Stephen Wu, Objective Confirmation of Subjective Measures of
Human Well-Being: Evidencefrom the U.S.A., 327 Sci. 576, 577 (2010).
113.
Id. at 578.
114.
Id. at 577 (citing Stuart A. Gabriel et al., Compensating Differentials and Evolution in the
Quality-of-Life Among U.S. States, 33 REG. SCi. URB. EcoN. 619 (2003)).
Id. at 579.
115.
116.
See Dick, supranote 95, at 387-99.
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national relocation. Risk aversion tends to prevent the decision maker from
making optimal moves if there is a risk of loss as well as a potential for
gain.' 17 Even if a potential mover rationally would expect to be better off
on a move, she is likely to stay at home unless the move looks especially
attractive. This is true even when the decision maker knows exactly what
the probabilities are. However, in a potential relocation, the decision maker
likely does not know the probabilities of success (improving her wellbeing) or failure (reducing her well-being). Third, default rules have been
found to have a strong effect on decision making (defaults are "sticky"),
even when they would appear extremely easy to overcome, such as
checking a box to make a 401(k) contribution."' 8 Staying put rather than
relocating would seem to be a rather strong default given the financial cost
to relocate as well as the need to spend time researching the facts.
As an example of these phenomena outside the relocation context, it is
apparent that even when one's health is at stake, decision making behavior
does not follow the pathways that classical economic models would
predict. Traditional models would expect that "the tremendous cost of longterm care, combined with a regulatory scheme that encourages reliance on
private funding sources, should lead the rational consumer with sufficient
resources to develop and maintain an economically sound financial plan for
long-term care."H 9 Contrary to these predictions, "most consumers do not
have a financial plan in place." 1 2 0 A behavioral economics model accounts
for this outcome in a number of ways.12 1 First, many people may find the
experience of even contemplating old age and health care unpleasant and so
would increase their utility by avoiding decision making entirely.12 2 Many
consumers may be deeply biased to prefer care by family members to
institutional care.123 Consumers also tend to overvalue current costs and
benefits to future costs and benefits. 12 4
Medical decision making is, to be sure, an imperfect analog to
relocation decision making; however, the discrepancy between the
expected results under a classical model of rational decision making and
the actual outcomes are surprising, even with a subject as vital as long term
health care. Similar obstacles to rational decision making might possibly
inhibit relocation decisions. It may be unpleasant to even begin to consider

117.
See RICHARD THAYER & CASS SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH,
WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 33-35 (2008).

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
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Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

103-11.
supra note 95, at 388.
389.
391.
393-94.
396.
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relocation-it may in other words enhance a worker's utility to assume that
home is optimal rather than question whether she could be better off
elsewhere. Relocation also involves comparing current costs to future
benefits and may not involve a perfect discounting heuristic.
The costs of relocation have taken on a qualitatively different character
after the housing bubble and collapse. Now, many homeowners owe more
on their mortgages than their homes are worth and cannot move even if
they would clearly be better off working in different locations, and they are
aware of this. Even those who are not "underwater" and are able to sell
may not want to sell because of psychological barriers to recognizing a
loss. 125
Another increasing factor in immobility is the aging of the population
and the prevalence of two-worker households. As demographer Peter
Francese aptly puts it:
The largest and most rapidly growing age groups in the U.S. are
people aged 45 to 54 (largest) and 55 to 64 (fastest growing).
People in those groups are in their prime working years, they have
kids in local schools, and have for the most part put down roots in
their communities.
They are far less likely to move away than someone in their 20s
or early 30s who have yet to form community bonds. Also, in
roughly half of all marriages, both spouses are employed full time.
This makes moving just to get a better job for one of them next to
impossible. 126
Even younger adults are staying put in unusual numbers. It is unclear
whether this is simply because they cannot find jobs, or because young
adults have become less confident than they were before about moving to
obtain a new job. 127

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF LOCAL COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENTS
This Part assesses options for implementation of the thesis developed
in Part I-that local cost of living should be a factor in determining the
125.
See David Kestenbaum, What a Coin Toss Has to Do with the Housing Market, NPR (Feb.
25, 2011, 1:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/02/25/134033237/what-a-coin-toss-has-todo-with-the-housing-market.
126.
Peter Francese, Contribution to A Nation of Hunkered-Down Homebodies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
10, 2010, 7:00 PM), http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/a-nation-of-hunkered-downhomebodies.
127.
See Sam Roberts, Slump Creates Lack of Mobility for Americans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22,
2009, at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/us/23census.htmi.
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taxpayer's ability to pay tax. First, for purposes of comparison, this Part
lays out a full indexation method; this or something similar will probably
be proposed by residents of high-cost areas. Second, consistent with Part I,
this Part rejects full indexation and suggests a fairer, more defensible
system targeting low-income taxpayers. Finally, this Part explores other
issues for implementation, including special issues relating to deductions,
construction of the cost of living index, and non-tax issues.
A.

Full Indexation

Recall that the federal income tax generally ignores local differences in
living costs, applying progressive rates to taxpayers in high-cost locations
beginning at too low an income. As a numerical example of how this leads
to unfairness, consider a world in which there are three otherwise identical
cities: Cheap, Average, and Pricey.12 8 Their cost of living indexes reflect
how much it costs, relative to the benchmark average cost, to purchase a
defined bundle of goods and services.' 2 9 Assume the cost of living index is
0.8 in Cheap, 1.0 in Average, and 1.2 in Pricey.' 30 This means $1,000 in
Cheap, $1,250 in Average, and $1,500 in Pricey are all approximately
equivalent to each other in terms of purchasing power. To state this another
way, one dollar buys a different amount of goods and services depending
on the location: 25% more goods and services in Cheap than in Average,
and 50% more in Cheap than in Pricey. In sum, the same incomes can carry
and different purchasing power can be
different purchasing power,'
expressed as the same income;13 2 this is the fundamental idea that has led
residents of high-income states to propose local cost of living
adjustments. 3 3
In the case of a flat tax with no exemptions, these cost of living
differences would not lead to any tax unfairness. This is because the tax
imposes the same reduction in purchasing power on taxpayers with the
same pre-tax purchasing power. As an example, a 10% tax on all income

This illustration is adapted from Knoll & Griffith, supra note 8, at 993-97 (examples using
128.
"Cheap," "Middling," and "Pricey" with cost of living indexes of 0.8, 1.0, and 1.2, respectively).
129.
As one potential source for these figures, each quarter, the American Chamber of Commerce
Research Association (ACCRA), a nonprofit organization, publishes a listing of cost of living indexes
by city.
130.
To be sure, larger variations do exist. In the ACCRA cost of living index, values range from
approximately 0.85 in Conway, Arkansas, to 2.2 in Manhattan. ACCRA COST OF LIVING INDEX, 2010
ANNUAL AVERAGE DATA (2011).
131.
Income of $0,000 represents different purchasing power among the three cities: 25% (1/.8)
more in Cheap than in Average, and 17% less (1/1.2) in Pricey than in Average.
132.
Incomes of $10,000 in Cheap, $12,500 in Average, and $15,000 in Pricey would represent
equivalent purchasing power.
See Sullivan, supra note 3.
133.
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would result in a $1,000 tax on a taxpayer in Cheap with an income of
$10,000; a $1,250 tax on a taxpayer in Average with an income of $12,500;
and a $1,500 tax on a taxpayer in Pricey with an income of $15,000. The
pre-tax incomes of all three taxpayers are equivalent in purchasing power,
as are the reductions in their purchasing power.
The federal income tax system, however, has multiple rates. Multiple
rates include both a zero-rate bracket of income (as established by the
standard deductionl34 and personal exemptions 35 ) and increasing rates at
higher incomes. 136 The fixed bracket amounts, standard deduction, and
personal exemptions will represent relatively high (25% higher) purchasing
power in Cheap, and relatively low (17% lower) purchasing power in
Pricey. If the tax system is not indexed, the tax will reduce the purchasing
power of a taxpayer in Cheap less than it reduces the purchasing power of a
taxpayer in Average, and even less than it reduces the purchasing power of
a taxpayer in Pricey, assuming they all start with the same pre-tax
purchasing power. The following table illustrates the effect for three
unmarried taxpayers with gross income equivalent to $100,000 in Average
terms. This illustration assumes 2011 tax ratesl 3 7 and deductions of $9,500,
which is equal to the standard deduction plus one personal exemption.

Gross Income
Taxable Income
Tax
Purchasing
Power of Tax in

Cheap
$80,000
$70,500
$13,750

Average
$100,000
$90,500
$18,957

Pricey
$120,000
$110,500
$24,557

$17,188

$18,957

$20,464

Average

To impose the same purchasing power reduction on all three taxpayers,
the tax brackets, the standard deduction, and the personal exemption could
be set lower in Cheap and higher in Pricey.' 3 8 This can be accomplished by
multiplying the brackets in Average terms by the cost of living index in
Cheap or Pricey. It is equivalent to (i) converting income into purchasing
power in Average terms by dividing the income in Cheap or Pricey by the
cost of living index in the relevant city; (ii) computing the amount of tax;
and then (iii) converting the amount of tax (which will be in Average
terms) into its equivalent in Cheap or Pricey by multiplying the amount of

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

I.R.C. §63.
I.R.C. § 151.
I.R.C. § 1.
Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297.
Cf Kaplow, supranote 8, at 183.
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tax by the cost of living index in the relevant city.1 3 For simplicity of
display, local cost of living adjustments will be illustrated using the income
conversion method rather than showing two new sets of brackets.
The following table shows the difference in tax liability if the tax
system is fully adjusted for local cost of living differences. 140 As above, the
illustration assumes the taxpayer is an unmarried individual with gross
income equal to $100,000 of purchasing power in Average who will take
no deductions other than the standard deduction and one personal
exemption.

Gross Income
Indexed Gross

Income 14 1
Indexed Tax
Actual Tax
Under

Cheap
$80,000

Average
$100,000

Pricey
$120,000

$100,000
$18,957

$100,000

$100,000

$18,957

$18,957

$15,166

$18,957

$22,748

$13,750

$18,957

$24,557

1 42

Proposal

Tax Under
Curen sem
Current
System

In sum, local cost of living adjustments result in additional tax in Cheap
and less tax in Pricey than under the actual tax system. Moreover,
taxpayers in Cheap, Average, and Pricey all pay different amounts of tax,
but these different amounts represent the same reduction in purchasing
power for taxpayers with the same pre-tax purchasing power.
Certain tax credits also could be adjusted for differences in purchasing
power due to local cost of living. There are, to be sure, different goals
underlying different credits. However, for a credit that is intended to be
redistributive, the theory underlying progressivityl43 would seem to apply
equally. Even if a credit and a deduction have a similar economic effect,
the law arguably has a different expressive function in a credit compared to
a deduction. This issue merits further consideration, but assuming the goal
of a transfer is to redistribute to the needy, it would seem appropriate to

139.
Cf id. at 183 n.18.
140.
This illustration, to be sure, is oversimplified, because the local cost of living adjustments
would have a revenue effect that would lead to a new set of tax brackets, etc., for an average cost
location.
141.
Indexed Gross Income = Gross Income/Cost-of-Living Index.
142.
Actual Tax = Indexed Tax * Cost-of-Living Index.
143.
See Part I.
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provide equally meaningful assistance to persons with the same purchasing
power.144
The Earned Income Tax Credit is a significant redistributive transfer
for many low-income taxpayers.145 The EITC provides a transfer equal to a
percentage of the taxpayer's earned income (40% for a single taxpayer with
two children), up to a maximum credit amount ($5,112) which is reached
when the taxpayer's income reaches the earned income amount
($12,780).146 The EITC stays flat over a further range of income
($12,780-$16,690), and then begins to phase out beginning at a fixed
income threshold ($16,690).147
As an illustration of the effect of a local cost-unindexed EITC, the
following table compares the schedule for the EITC among Cheap,
Average, and Pricey for a single parent with two qualifying children. Dollar
amounts for Cheap and Pricey are converted into their purchasing power in
Average.

Earned Income
Amount
Max. Credit
Threshold
Phase-out
Completed
Phase-out

Cheap
$15,975Average
$6,390Average
Average
$20,863Average
$51,205Average

Average
$12780
$5,112
$16,690
$40,964

Pricey
$10,650Average
$4,260Average
Average
$13,908Average
$34,136Average

The maximum credit will represent relatively high purchasing power in
Cheap and relatively low purchasing power in Pricey. The fixed phase-out
threshold will correspond to relatively high purchasing power in Cheap and
relatively low purchasing power in Pricey. This means that benefits begin
phasing out too late in Cheap, where workers are less needy and too early
in Pricey, where workers are needier.] 48 This can be corrected by the same
adjustment as the income tax brackets. The earned income amount and
144.
But see supra text accompanying notes 79-80 (discussing potential countervailing efficiency
considerations).
145.
See Moran, supra note 49, at 326-29; Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who's Afraid ofRedistribution?
An Analysis of the Earned Income Tax Credit, 74 Mo. L. REV. 251, 258-60 (2009) (noting lack of
explicit legislative intent but clear redistributive effect).
146.
See I.R.C. § 32(a); Rev. Proc. 2011-12, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297.
147.
Id.
148.
This appears to significantly hinder the EITC's effectiveness as a work incentive rather than
redistributive program. See Fitzpatrick & Thompson, supra note 37, at 437 ("[T]he high-cost areas
where the EITC produces no discernible labor supply . .. represent as much as 40 percent of the total
population.").
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phase-out threshold can be multiplied by the location's cost of living to
create a new set of EITC brackets. Or, the taxpayer's income can be
converted into purchasing power in Average; the credit would be calculated
using the Average schedule, and then converted into its equivalent in
Cheap or Pricey by multiplying by the local cost of living index.
B. PartialIndexation
As discussed in Part I.C, adjusting for local cost of living is most
defensible at low incomes. Admittedly, the lines between the poor and the
middle class and the wealthy are rather imprecise and subjective. There is a
broad range of options, the two endpoints of which are sketched below.
One approach that has some precedent in the current tax system is the
threshold for the phase-out of personal exemptions and the threshold for the
overall limitation on itemized deductions-both were $166,800 in 2009.149
These phase-outs presumably reflect a decision to impose additional tax on
high-income taxpayers in a less obvious manner than by modifying the tax
rate schedule. Eliminating tax benefits for high-income taxpayers would
require a decision concerning both the threshold for and the speed of the
phase-out. A paradigm exists in Section 11,150 where a high-income
corporation's tax is increased over a certain range of income to eliminate
the benefit of the low-rate tax brackets.15 1 A consequence of this manner of
149.
These phase-outs have been temporarily abolished since 2010 but are scheduled to resume in
2013. Another idea is the $200,000 figure that President Obama has offered up to identify a wealthy
individual. See Ron Lieber, A Tax Plan That Might Not Be So Painful,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2011, at
B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/24/your-money/taxes/obama-tax-plan-could-be-awash-for-some-high-eamers.html.
150.
I.R.C. § II(b)(1) provides:
The amount of the tax imposed by subsection (a) shall be the sum of(A) 15 percent of so much of the taxable income as does not exceed $50,000,
(B) 25 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $50,000 but does not
exceed $75,000,
(C) 34 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $75,000 but does not
exceed $10,000,000, and
(D) 35 percent of so much of the taxable income as exceeds $10,000,000.
In the case of a corporation which has taxable income in excess of $100,000 for any taxable
year, the amount of tax determined under the preceding sentence for such taxable year shall
be increased by the lesser of (i) 5 percent of such excess, or (ii) $11,750. In the case of a
corporation which has taxable income in excess of $15,000,000, the amount of the tax
determined under the foregoing provisions of this paragraph shall be increased by an
additional amount equal to the lesser of (i) 3 percent of such excess, or (ii) $100,000.
151.

See 6 FED. TAX COORDINATOR (SECOND SERIES) (RIA)

D-1005 (2007) ("The graduated

rates for corporations are phased out at certain income levels. Thus, the tax saving of $11,750 on the
first $75,000 of taxable income (i.e, the tax on the first $75,000 of income is $11,750 less than if the tax
on all its income were 34%) is phased out for corporations with taxable income in excess of $100,000
and the tax saving of $100,000 on the first $10,000,000 of taxable income (i.e, the tax on the first
$10,000,000 of income is $100,000 less than if the tax on all its income were 35%) is phased out for
corporations with taxable income in excess of $15,000,000.").
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phase-out is that over the phase-out range there would be higher marginal
rates than the nominal statutory rate.
Arguably, however, the "high-income" threshold discussed above is
too high for the purpose of local cost of living adjustments. Another
approach, which would be better targeted to lower-income taxpayers and
have the benefit of simplicity, is adjusting only the standard deduction,
personal exemption, and EITC for local cost of living. The standard
deduction tends to effectively phase out at moderate-to-high incomes,
because of the increasing importance of itemized deductions. There would
be some unintended consequences from modifying the standard deduction;
absent a separation of the standard deduction's zero-rate and floor
5 2
function,1
it would effectively nullify the effect of a greater amount of
itemized deductions in high-cost areas, where the standard deduction would
increase.
C. Special Issues Relating to Deductions
As discussed in Part I, the normative income tax base includes the sum
of consumption plus changes in wealth. Expenses incurred in profit-seeking
activity reduce wealth but do not represent consumption, so they should
reduce the income tax base. Consumption may also be framed as a
manifestation of ability to pay, whereas non-consumption expenses reduce
the taxpayer's ability to pay. As discussed below, the Code generally
follows this theoretical framework, but there are exceptions.
The most basic deduction in an income tax is for expenses incurred in
profit-seeking activities. Section 162(a) allows a deduction for "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in
carrying on any trade or business," while Section 212(a) provides a similar
deduction for expenses incurred in producing income (even though not
rising to the level of a "business"). 15 3 Because the amount of the allowable
deduction generally equals the full amount of expenses paid, 15 4 such
deductions are implicitly indexed to local costs.
In contrast, the Code generally disallows deductions in respect of
"personal, living, or family expenses."155 The Code does, however, include
152.
See John R. Brooks II, Doing Too Much: The StandardDeduction and the Conflict Between
Progressivityand Simpification, 2 COLUM. J. TAX L. 203 (2011) (arguing that the standard deduction
should be a zero-rate bracket and floors on itemized deductions should be individualized deduction-bydeduction).
I.R.C. §§ 162(a), 212(a).
153.
154.
The allowable deduction for certain profit-seeking expenses that are incurred in an activity
not considerable or regular enough to qualify as a business may be reduced by the floor on
miscellaneous itemized deductions and the overall limitation on itemized deductions. See I.R.C. §§ 67,
68.
I.R.C. § 262(a).
155.

618

Alabama Law Review

[Vol. 63:3:591

a number of special provisions allowing deductions for personal expenses.
As discussed below, some of these rules may have the effect of a local cost
of living adjustment, but they do not correctly implement the principle that
ability to pay depends on purchasing power. This Article has argued that it
is unfair to ignore the taxpayer's purchasing power, but it is another thing
to allow a deduction based on the taxpayer's actual personal expenses.
1. Homeownership
The federal income tax grants numerous subsidies for
homeownership.156 Personal interest expense is generally nondeductible,
but an exception to this limitation is the allowance of an itemized deduction
for home mortgage interest.'5 7 Taxpayers generally may deduct interest
paid with respect to up to $1 million of acquisition indebtedness and
$100,000 of home equity indebtedness with respect to a qualified
residence. 58 Even though the taxpayer may deduct the expense of owning a
home, the taxpayer does not include the imputed rental value of the home
in income. Finally, the taxpayer may exclude from income a gain of up to
$250,000 on the sale of a residence meeting certain requirements. 15 9
Neither the $1,100,000 total maximum indebtedness for purposes of
the mortgage interest deduction nor the $250,000 maximum exclusion from
gains on the sale of a qualified residence is indexed for local cost of living
differences. These caps are more generous in low-cost locations than in
high-cost locations. However, most taxpayers are not limited by the cap on
qualified indebtedness because the cap is such a large amount. This leaves
ample room for variation below the cap so that homeowners where the cost
of living is low typically borrow less-and therefore deduct a lesser
amount of interest-than taxpayers who reside in high-cost areas. Though
the exclusion of imputed income is unlimited, the imputed rental valueand thus the understatement of income-is greater as the value of the home
increases. Thus, in a rough way, the mortgage interest deduction and the
exclusion of imputed rental value appear to result in a greater reduction of
the tax base in high-cost areas than in low-cost areas.160

156.
(2009).
157.

See Dorothy A. Brown, Shades of the American Dream, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 329, 336-39
The mortgage interest deduction is one of the largest items in the tax expenditure budget.

See J. COMM.

ON TAX'N,

BACKGROUND

INFORMATION

ON TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS

AND

HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES 18 (Mar. 1, 2011), available at http://www.jct.

gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3740.
158.
I.R.C. §§ 163(h)(1), (2)(D), (3).
159.
I.R.C. § 121.
160.
See Angelini & Noga, supra note 32, at 6.
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The reduction of the tax base from homeownership preferences, though
disproportionately allocable to high-cost areas, does not achieve tax equity.
Ability to pay should be linked to purchasing power, not the taxpayer's
actual purchasing decisions. In addition, densely populated areas with
building restrictions are most likely to see the tax benefits of
homeownership capitalized into the price of housing, so the apparent tax
benefit in high-cost areas may well be illusory.'61 Areas where land is
plentiful or development is less regulated will tend to have lower housing
prices and tend not to see the tax benefits of homeownership capitalized
into home prices. 162 Thus, what appears to be an indirect form of local cost
of living adjustment seems to favor low-cost areas in its actual operation.
Most scholarly commentators advocate the abolition of the mortgage
interest deduction, noting that it is inefficient, fails to encourage
homeownership (as opposed to more expensive homes), and channels tax
benefits disproportionately to wealthy households. 63 Elimination of the
mortgage interest deduction would, in a rough way, offset the inequity of
the exclusion of imputed rental value. Because it is practically
inconceivable that imputed rent would be taxed, the abolition of the
mortgage interest deduction is the next best solution. 164 The solution is
second best not only because the offset (mortgage interest versus imputed
income) is rough, but also because there is no offset at all to the extent of
home equity (i.e., there is imputed income but no offsetting interest
expense to disallow as a deduction).
The mortgage interest deduction, despite its poor reception among tax
scholars, may not be repealed any time soon. If a limited form of partial
indexing were to be adopted (i.e., only the standard deduction, personal
exemption, and EITC), as this Article suggests, the homeownership
subsidies would have a limited conflict, because only itemizers deduct
home mortgage interest. It is true that some low-income households would
still benefit from the imputed income exclusion, and thus may have more

161.
See William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Encouraging
Homeownership Through the Tax Code, 115 TAX NOTES 1171, 1179(2007).
Id.
162.
163.
See Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., The Accidental Deduction: A History and Critique of the Tax
Subsidy for Mortgage Interest, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 259-62 (2010) (noting "consensus of
postwar tax experts" against the mortgage interest deduction); Brown, supra note 156, at 333 n.13
("Adding insult to injury, economists agree that virtually no one buys a house because of those tax
subsidies, but the subsidies do increase the cost of housing.").
164.
See Gale et. al., supranote 161, at 1182 ("Gross imputed rent on owner-occupied housing is
not currently taxed, however, and there is virtually no chance that it will be taxed in the U.S. in the
foreseeable future. As a result, a search for alternative, or second-best, tax policies toward housing is
necessary."). Other countries have experimented with taxing imputed rental values but have generally
abandoned the effort due to administrative difficulties. See Richard K. Green, Homeowning, Social
Outcomes, Tenure Choice, and U.S. Housing Policy, 5 CITYSCAPE: J. POL'Y DEv. & RES. 21, 27
(2001), available at http://www.huduser.org/periodicals/citysepe/vol5num2/green.pdf.
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ability to pay than appears on the surface. Policymakers might consider
limiting local cost of living adjustments to renters, but this would distort
the decision whether to own a home, and might unfairly exclude too many
taxpayers for whom the amount of imputed income is not significant.
2. State and Local Taxes
The deduction for state and local taxes165 is another important itemized
deduction that varies significantly depending on the taxpayer's residence.
State and local taxes are excluded from cost of living indexes, such as
ACCRA, because they depend too much on a taxpayer's personal
circumstances.1 66 Thus, a deduction for state and local taxes would not be
"double dipping" in a system with local cost of living adjustments. Indeed,
if the partial indexation method were adopted, policy makers might
consider adding an amount to the cost of living index for state and local
taxes to simulate the deduction for non-itemizers. There is, however, an
issue as to whether state and local taxes should be conceived of as an
amount paid that varies with the value of local benefits. 16 7 In other words,
do state and local taxes reduce purchasing power or simply represent an
additional purchase? State and local taxes are not voluntary and may
depend as much on greatly differing state fiscal capacities as actual benefits
received.168 Moreover, the limitations on taxpayer mobility would seem to
apply equally in the context of state and local taxes. Thus, it is defensible to
conceive of the taxpayer's state and local taxes as reducing ability to pay
and therefore not in tension with local cost of living adjustments. 169
3. Deduction Phase-Outs
Many personal itemized deductions are disallowed or phased out after a
certain high-income threshold. Under the partial indexation proposal,
deduction phase-outs generally would not need to be adjusted for local cost
165.
See l.R.C. § 164.
See ACCRA Cost of Living Index Methodology, COUNCIL FOR CMTY. & ECON. RESEARCH,
166.
http://c2c.coli.org/compare.asp?action=methodology (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
167.
See Brian Galle, Federal Fairnessto State Taxpayers: Irrationality, Unfunded Mandates,
and the "SALT" Deduction, 106 MICH. L. REV. 805, 817-18 (2008) (questioning the rational taxpayer
model and arguing that "citizens will sometimes fail to recognize that an alternative package of taxes
and benefits would better satisfy their preferences").
168.
See Kirk J. Stark, Rich States, PoorStates: Assessing the Design and Effect of a U.S. Fiscal
Equalization Regime, 63 TAX L. REV. 957, 957-58 (2010) (describing differences in state fiscal
capacity that have not been equalized by the federal government, noting that most other developed
countries provide equalization payments to poor states).
169.
This Article is considering the deduction through the lens of ability to pay and equity; there
may, of course, be other reasons that the state and local tax deduction may or may not be desirable. See
Galle, supra note 167, at 831-42 (discussing vertical exporting, externalities, and federalism concerns).
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of living. However, under a more complete indexation approach, some of
the phase-outs would need to be adjusted for local cost of living. In general,
phase-outs that reference a constant amount will need to be adjusted for
local cost of living. Otherwise, the phase-out will begin disallowing
deductions at too low an income in high-cost locations and at too high an
income in low-cost locations. Phase-outs in this category include the
overall limitation on itemized deductionsiv and the personal exemption
phase-out.17 1 In addition, floors expressed as a percentage of adjusted gross
income (AGI)17 2 would, under a full indexation approach, need to be
reconfigured. For example, the 2% of AGI floor on miscellaneous itemized
deductions' 7 1 would pertain to this category.
D. Constructinga Local Cost ofLiving Index
As indicated previously, local cost of living adjustments are rare in the
federal income tax system, but there is at least one existing model that can
be built upon in constructing an index. A taxpayer may submit an offer in
compromise to the IRS to settle a tax debt, if the taxpayer has insufficient
income and assets to pay the debt in full.17 4 The IRS must apply localitybased guidelines to ensure that the taxpayer retains "adequate means to
provide for basic living expenses."' 7 5 Although the IRS has issued national
standards for food, clothing, and other items, its guidelines for housing and
utilities drill down to the county level.17 6 This is not to suggest that no work
remains to be done; this Article assumes that it would be feasible to
construct a fair and reliable local cost of living index. Moreover, the fact
that the IRS has been obligated to determine ability to pay by local
standards for many years suggests that developing other local cost of living
indices would not be an insurmountable administrative burden.

170.
See I.R.C. § 68(a) (generally reducing the amount of certain itemized deductions by "3
percent of the excess of adjusted gross income over the [inflation adjusted] applicable amount").
171.
See I.R.C. § 15 1(d)(3) (for an unmarried taxpayer, the personal exemption is phased out by
"2 percentage points for each $2,500 (or fraction thereof) by which the taxpayer's adjusted gross
income for the taxable year exceeds the [inflation adjusted] threshold amount").
172.
See I.R.C. § 62. Adjusted gross income means the taxpayer's gross income less certain
deductions, commonly called "above the line" deductions. The principal above the line deductions are
business deductions, reimbursed employee business expenses, losses from sales of property, and
expenses attributable to the production of rents or royalties. Id
173.
See I.R.C. § 67(a) (disallowing "miscellaneous itemized deductions" except "to the extent
that the aggregate of such deductions exceeds 2 percent of adjusted gross income"). The classic
examples of miscellaneous itemized deduction are unreimbursed employee business expenses and
investment expenses.
174.
See I.R.C. § 7122; IRS Form 656, availableat http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f656.pdf.
175.
I.R.C. §7122(d)(2)(A).
176.
See Collection Financial Standards, IRS, http://www.irs.gov/individuals/article/0,,id=
96543,00.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2012).
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E. Non-Tax Issues
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address all federal programs,
but the theoretical bases of progressive taxation would appear to have
potential relevancy to many other federal government programs. In general,
the federal government's incorporation of local cost of living into spending
programs appears to be haphazard and unpredictable. Scholars should work
toward a careful and consistent approach to which federal programs should
be indexed and explanations for departures from that principle.
Federal social welfare programs (e.g., social security, food stamps, and
cash and other Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) generally are not
adjusted for local cost of living.7 7 There are, however, important
exceptions. Federal housing assistance programs generally base eligibility
on a percentage of local area median income.'7 8 For example, in the Section
8 Housing Choice Voucher program, local Public Housing Authorities
receive applications for vouchers and administer waiting lists. 79 Public
Housing Authorities have some flexibility in prioritizing the waiting list,
but the program is targeted at extremely low-income households, which
have an income below 30% of the local area median income.' 8 0 Families
who receive vouchers must make a rent contribution of 30-40% of their
adjusted income.18' The federal government makes up the difference
between the family's payment and a maximum payment, which is set by
the Public Housing Authority at between 90-100% of local fair market
rent.' 82 Fair market rents are based on a survey of rents for standard units in
each metropolitan area or non-metropolitan county in the country.183
As a proportion of federal spending, Section 8 housing assistance is a
relatively modest program.184 Medicare, however, is one of the largest
components of federal spending. Medicare tailors payments to prevailing
local costs even though contributions are not based on local costs.'"' As an
example, under Medicare Part B physician reimbursements are based on a
fee schedule determined by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid

177.

See Kaplow, supranote 8, at 175-76.
178.
See KAREN SPAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33340, CASH AND NONCASH BENEFITS FOR
PERSONS WITH LIMITED INCOME: ELIGIBILITY RULES, RECIPIENT AND EXPENDITURE DATA, FY 2002 FY 2004, at 18-19 (2006) [hereinafter CRS REPORT].
179.
HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, 2008 GREENBOOK 15-2 (2008).
180.
CRS REPORT, supranote 178, at 89.

181.

Id. at 90.

182.

Id.

183.
184.

Id.
Id at 89.

185.

See Melissa H. Weresh, Effect of Geographic Practice Cost Indices on Physician

Reimbursement and PatientAccess, 5 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 362, 366, 369 (2008).
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Services (CMS). 18 6 Rates are adjusted based on geographic practice cost
indices set for eighty-nine payment locations.187
CONCLUSION
Imposing tax based on ability to pay, which depends in part on what
the taxpayer can afford to purchase where the taxpayer lives, is consistent
with a progressive federal income tax system that taxes earnings, not
endowment. This Article has proposed a local cost of living adjustment
targeted at low-income taxpayers. From a neoclassical perspective,
indexing for living costs does too much, yet targeting low-income
taxpayers does too little. This Article's approach may have a social cost,
but the moral opportunity in reducing inequality should not be ignored. 88
As Henry Simons wrote, "Both progress and justice are costly
luxuries-costly, above all, in terms of each other."l 89

186.
Id. at 363.
187.
Id. at 363-65.
188.
See McCluskey, supra note 42, at 820-21 (The "alternative visions refuse to define existing
market structures as necessarily and naturally efficient-in the overall societal interest-they escape the
problem that alternative distributions of rights and responsibilities are inherently harmful to aggregate
well-being.... Each reconstructs the increased bargaining power resulting from government protection
for impoverished families as socially beneficial moral opportunity, not moral hazard.")
189.
HENRY C. SIMONs, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 24 (1938).

